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This paper addresses German energy policy instruments and their compatibility with WTO 
rules. Germany and the EU are forerunners in international climate change policy and driving 
forces behind the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. German energy policy includes approaches to foster 
electricity generation from renewable resources. Our major question is whether both the policy 
tools currently applied (standards, taxes and subsidies) and those under consideration (labels, 
green certificates and border tax adjustment) are compatible with WTO rules. Our findings are 
that currently neither the design nor the application of the policy instruments are in conflict 
with WTO rules. However, the setting of production standards for electricity supply is the cru-
cial issue in this debate and if trade in electricity increases, so will the potential for conflict. 
Rejecting imports because of the way electricity was produced could lead to disputes and to a 
need for settlements by the WTO legal system. Moreover, when introducing tools like green 
certificates or border tax adjustments, it is important to find the balance between effectively 
fostering the reduction of global emissions and eligibility under WTO law.  
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The conflict between environmental policy measures and international trade liberalisation 
has been the subject of detailed analyses and discussions. An important aspect is how na-
tional environmental policy tools are related to obligations under world trade law as ad-
ministered by the World Trade Organization (WTO). This study focuses on the new Ger-
man energy policy initiatives, which aim at reducing greenhouse gas emissions using dif-
ferent policy instruments. Our major question is whether the new German energy policy 
tools already being applied (standards, taxes, subsidies) or envisaged (labels, certificates) 
are compatible with WTO rules. Moreover, we include border tax adjustments in our 
analysis, which are proposed in the literature as an instrument to avoid the negative effects 
of domestic energy taxes on the international competitiveness of the economy or certain 
sectors. However, we do not discuss the international CO2-emission trading system, which 
is currently under construction. We also exclude the long-standing issue of reducing subsi-
dies for fossil fuels and oils, especially coal.2 Instead, we concentrate on new national pol-
icy instruments that foster energy efficiency and electricity generation from renewable 
resources in Germany.  
Emissions from energy production and consumption are a major global environmental 
problem because they contribute to global climate change. The earth’s atmosphere is a 
global common, and this leads to severe problems related to its protection. Global com-
mons are characterised by an ill-fated distribution of property rights. If policy measures 
aim at protecting them, no one country can be excluded from the benefits. This situation 
leads to the well-known free-rider problem. Game theory suggests that – as long as only 
national interests are maximised – co-operation among nations is not a dominant strategy.3 
Hence, most nations have no incentive to contribute to the protection of the Earth’s atmos-
phere, as long as there is no co-ordination ensuring that all countries participate at least to 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank Ingrid Hanhoff, Ulf Jäckel, Michael Kohlhaas, Volker Oschmann, Barbara 
Praetorius, Kai Schlegelmilch, Sabrina Shaw, Jan-Eirik Sørensen, René Vossenaar, and Hans-Joachim Zi-
esing for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
2 This would certainly be an important step to protect the climate. See for example The Economist, Environ-
mental Enemy No. 1, (July 6
th 2002). 
3 Many analyses of global environmental problems therefore use the game theory concept of the prisoners’ 
dilemma. E.g. D. Fudenberg; J. Tirole: Game Theory, Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, (1991); J. Heister: Der  
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some extent. The Kyoto Protocol (1997) aims at a global reduction of greenhouse gas 
(GHG-) emissions according to the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) and following the Rio 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. However, recent problems in rati-
fying the Kyoto Protocol and agreeing on its amendments, and the complete withdrawal of 
the US in 2001, have made clear once more the conflict of interest, the different judge-
ments and the different levels of risk aversion within the group of industrialised countries, 
who are the major emitters of GHGs, as well as between industrialised and developing 
countries. All these problems hinder the implementation of optimal global policy meas-
ures. 
Thus, it seems that only through decisive action by single countries or coalitions of coun-
tries can real progress be made in international climate change policy. A few countries are 
currently acting as forerunners. Germany in particular has included the reduction of GHG-
emissions from its territory as a central policy goal in its energy policy.4 This is expressed 
in several laws: 
-  the Ecological Tax Reform (ETR) increased taxes on electricity and fossil fuels on a 
yearly basis from 1999 to 2003; 
-  the  Renewable Energies Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG)) and the Co-
generation Act (Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungsgesetz (KWKG)) use price guarantees or 
price mark-ups as their main policy instrument to save energy or use it more effi-
ciently;  
-  the Großfeuerungsanlagenverordnung (GFAVO) sets emission standards for sulphur 
dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NOx), dust, carbon monoxide, fluorides and chlorides in 
large combustion plants based on coal, oil and natural gas; 
-  the Energieverbrauchskennzeichnungsgesetz (EnVKG) and the Energieverbrauchs-
kennzeichnungsverordung (EnVKVO) specify rules concerning energy consumption in 
the use of products and labelling requirements;  
-  the  Energieeinsparungsgesetz (EnEG) and the Energieeinsparverordnung (EnEV) 
regulate the saving of energy and the insulation of buildings, respectively;   
-  the Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (EnWG) regulates electricity and gas supplies – but is not 
primarily concerned with environmental goals. 
In order to make national policies more effective, it is necessary to co-ordinate or even to 
harmonise efforts internationally. In such a process, in order to prevent conflicts between 
                                                                                                                                                    
internationale CO2-Vertrag. Strategien zur Stabilisierung multilateraler Kooperation zwischen souveränen 
Staaten, Tübingen, (1997).  
4 See Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie: <http://www.bmwi.de/Homepage/Politikfelder/ 
Energiepolitik.html>.  
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trade and environmental policies, the PPP could be an important principle.5 So far, WTO 
rules do not include this principle. And neither the 1992 UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change nor the 1997 Kyoto Protocol explicitly require or endorse specific trade-
relevant policies. Parties are obliged, however, to enact policies and measures to achieve 
the ultimate objective of the climate convention, while at the same time maintaining an 
open trading system. As long as there is no internationally institutionalised approach to the 
integration of these policy fields, the analysis of national policies and their international 
effects is necessary on a case-by-case basis.  
The next section gives a short overview on WTO rules and principles relevant to the analy-
sis of German energy policy. In sections 3 to 7, we analyse the compatibility of national 
command and control measures, labels, certificates, taxes, and subsidies with WTO rules 
respectively. The paper concludes with some final remarks in section 8. 
2  Relevant WTO Principles 
This section highlights the most important concepts, principles and definitions in the WTO 
regime that are relevant for our discussion.  
2.1 Basic  Principles 
The WTO trade regime relies on several basic principles. The most relevant for our study 
are the most-favoured nation principle in Article I (1) GATT and the national treatment 
principle in Article III (4) GATT. 
Article III (4) GATT states that  
“The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their 
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. […]” 
Article I (1) GATT states that  
“[…], any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties." 
 
                                                 
5 R. A. Westin: Environmental Tax Initiatives and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Dangerous Collisions, The 
Hague, London, Boston, (1997), p. 57 f.  
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2.2  Standards and Technical Regulations 
There are three kinds of standards that can distinguish a product under WTO law:  
- First,  product standards, which determine certain characteristics of a product during its 
consumption.  
- Second,  product-related standards, which address those characteristics of a good that 
are determined by the production methods and are incorporated into the product.  
- Third,  non-product-related standards, which are related to the production methods used 
but not to the good itself. 
The latter two are both standards on processes and production methods (PPMs), but they 
are sometimes treated differently under WTO law.  
A definition of standards and technical regulations is included in the Agreement on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), a side agreement to the GATT. As a rule, all 
standards regulated by these agreements must be applied in accordance with the GATT 
most-favoured nation and national treatment principles. Both definitions, Annex 1.1 and 
1.2 TBT Agreement, include PPMs as criteria for the differentiation of products. However, 
neither definition makes it clear whether non-product-related standards are subject to TBT 
rules. Based on the negotiation history of the TBT Agreement and on the panel rulings on 
“like products”6, several studies conclude that non-product-related criteria are not stan-
dards that are allowed to distinguish products as being "unlike" under the TBT Agreement 
and GATT7. Nevertheless, as the Asbestos Case (Canada – France 2001)8 implies, national 
law can distinguish products based on PPMs and it can apply the same distinction to im-
ports. Only if there is discrimination of imports due to this approach are these standards 
incompatible with WTO Law.9 
                                                 
6 WTO-Alcoholic Beverages Panel: Report of the Panel, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, 
WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, (11 July 1996). 
7 A. Michaelowa: Trade and Labelling of Timber and Timber Products, Aussenwirtschaft 52(4), (1997), 561-
581; S. W. Chang: GATTing a Green Trade Barrier Eco-Labelling and the WTO Agreement on Technical Bar-
riers to Trade, Journal of World Trade 31(1), (1997), 137-159; S. Dröge: Ecological Labelling and the World 
Trade Organization, Aussenwirtschaft 56(1), (2001), 99-122. 
8 WTO-Appellate Body: EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products; 
WT/DS135/AB/R, (12 March 2001). 
9 R. Howse, E. Tuerk: The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations - A Case Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos 
Dispute, in: G. De Búrca, J. Scott (eds.): The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues, Oxford, 
(2001), 283-328, p. 289.  
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2.3  The Term “like products” 
The term “like products” is included in Article III GATT and other WTO rules on trade in 
goods, and it occurs sixteen times throughout the GATT texts. The term was never clearly 
defined. In 1970, the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments recommended a case-by-
case examination of problems arising from the interpretation of this term.10 It defined four 
criteria for the “likeness” of products: 
(i)  the properties, nature and quality of the products; 
(ii)  the end-uses of the products; 
(iii)  consumers´ tastes and habits; and 
(iv)  the tariff classification of the products.11  
These criteria were also used in the most recent ruling concerning “likeness”, the Asbestos 
Case, which shed a new light on the issue. The Appellate Body pronounced that the evi-
dence on each of the four criteria should be examined and then weighed together with any 
other evidence in order to determine whether a product could be regarded as "like".12 Ac-
cording to the Appellate Body, other criteria might be added to analyse whether two prod-
ucts are “like” or not13.  
2.4  Exemptions from Basic Principles 
Exemptions from the basic principles can be made for “measures necessary [...] for the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or the environment [...]”, which must 
not lead to “arbitrary or unjustifiable” discrimination between countries (Preamble of the 
TBT Agreement). The same exception is stated in Article XX GATT. For German energy 
policy aiming at the reduction of a global environmental problem this exception could be-
come a last resort in cases, where the policy measures were held inconsistent with WTO 
provisions.  
                                                 
10 BISD - Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (GATT/WTO): Decisions, Reports, etc. of the 16
th and 
17
th Sessions. Review Pursuant to Article XVI:5. Geneva, (1997), para. 18. 
11 Ibid., para 18 and see supra, footnote 8, para. 101. 
12 In the Asbestos case, another important evidence was that toxicity is “a defining aspect of the physical 
properties” of asbestos fibres. See World Trade Institute: Appellate Body Report. European Communities – 
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products. WorldTradeLaw.net Dispute Settlement Com-
mentary (DSC). <http://worldtradelaw.net.>, (2001); S. Shaw, R. Schwartz: Trade and Environment in the 
WTO. State of Play; Journal of World Trade 36(1), (2002), 129-154, p. 150. 
13 See supra 8, para. 102.  
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The scope of these provisions has been analysed at great length in the literature.14 A central 
distinction needs to be made between those trade measures that are enacted unilaterally, 
and those that are required by a multilateral environmental agreement.15 There are various 
options for a reform of Article XX that would assist in delineating unilateral and multilat-
eral action, including a proposal for a Declaration of Interpretation of Article XX through 
the WTO assembly.16 Even if this clear distinction existed, the issue remains whether 
trade-relevant environmental policies—especially in the context of national energy pol-
icy—would be defined as a unilateral measure or as a measure covered by a multilateral 
environmental agreement.  
3  Command and Control Policies  
3.1  Definition and Application in Germany 
Command and control policies are still the most widely used instrument in environmental 
policy, even though the use of market-oriented policy instruments (like taxes and informa-
tion tools) has increased over the last decade. The term “command and control” refers to 
laws and regulations on environmental standards. Non-compliance with these standards usu-
ally results in sanctions.17  
There are two types of measures available within the framework of command and control 
policies: prohibitions and commandments. Both are political measures linked to the PPP, 
because the costs of fulfilling a standard are borne by the polluter. Prohibitions are the 
strongest instrument used to achieve environmental goals. They are used either to ban toxic 
or hazardous material completely or to enable immediate measures to prevent risks to human 
                                                 
14 See WTO-Appellate Body: EU Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones); Report of the 
Appellate Body AB-1997-4, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, (16 January 1998). 
15 WTO-Appellate Body (1998a): United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products; 
Report of the Appellate Body AB-1998-4, WT/DS58/AB/R from 12 October 1998, 38 ILM 118 (1999). See for 
an extended argument on Shrimp/Turtle. F. Biermann: The rising tide of green unilateralism in world trade 
law: Options for reconciling the emerging North-South conflict; Journal of World Trade 35(3), (June 2001), 
421-448. See also with different assessments S. Cone: The Appellate Body, the Protection of Sea Turtles and 
the Technique of ›Completing the Analysis‹, Journal of World Trade 33(1), (1999), 51-61; R. Howse: The Tur-
tles Panel: Another Environmental Disaster in Geneva, Journal of World Trade 32(1), (1998), 73-100; K. 
Jones: Trade Policy and the Environment: The Search for an Institutional Framework; Aussenwirtschaft 53, 
(1998), 409-434. 
16 See W. Althammer, F. Biermann, S. Dröge, M. Kohlhaas, Handelsliberalisierung kontra Umweltschutz? 
Ansätze für eine Stärkung umweltpolitischer Ziele in der Welthandelsordnung, Berlin: Analytica, (2001); and 
Biermann, supra, footnote 15.  
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health. Potential victims of pollution are protected to the highest possible degree. Com-
mandments regulate emissions through rules fixed in law, in order to obtain a certain level of 
emissions. They can regulate the emissions directly (emission standards) or indirectly 
through standards on PPMs. Also, the composition of the product itself (product standards) 
can be controlled by laws and regulations concerning, for example, the amount of harmful 
substances they contain. 
Traditionally, command and control policies are regarded as being effective, easy to man-
age, relatively simple to impose and broadly accepted by the population.18 However, from 
a welfare economic point of view they are inefficient because the policy goal will not be 
obtained at minimum cost for society. Also, emission standards do not provide an incentive 
to reduce emissions below the levels fixed by law nor do they require the polluter to pay 
for residual pollution.   
German environmental policy has a long tradition in using command and control measures. 
Within the framework of the German climate change policy, there are a number of laws 
and regulations (see section 1) that have been introduced or revised during the last decade. 
They use standards or rules to regulate emissions from energy consumption or from energy 
production.  
3.2  Potential Conflicts with WTO Law 
Potential conflicts of national command and control energy policies with WTO law could 
arise from the type of standard used and the way the standard is applied to foreign prod-
ucts. 
In principle, the WTO approach is that every country is free to protect its population 
through product and product-related standards, if these standards are not applied in a dis-
criminatory manner against foreign suppliers. This means that a foreign product can be 
rejected at the border only if this type of product is domestically forbidden as well. In prin-
ciple, the same rules apply to non-product-related standards on processes and production 
methods (PPMs). However, these standards do not constitute a characteristic of a product 
according to WTO interpretation of term "like products". As a consequence, a country can 
                                                                                                                                                    
17 M. G. Faure: Environmental Regulation, Maastricht University, (1998), Chap. 2300, 443-520, p. 453. 
18 L. Wicke: Umweltökonomie: Eine praxisorientierte Einführung, Munich, (1993), 4
th Edition, p. 201 f.  
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determine such domestic standards for domestic producers, but their application as a stan-
dard to distinguish domestic from imported goods is in general not part of the "like prod-
uct" concept under WTO rules.  
From a purely environmentalist perspective the logic behind the current WTO approach 
could be seen as flawed. If emissions, e.g. from power generation, damage a global com-
mon in the production process but not through the use of the final product, non-product-
related instruments, such as production standards or taxes, are the only measure available 
to protect the environment. On these grounds, some authors19 argue that even unilaterally 
applied standards with extraterritorial effects (e.g. standards prescribed by an importing 
country exclusively for production processes abroad) could be justified if an exporting 
country is not internalising the external costs of production, and that such standards could 
be justified through the preamble of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement) and through the Article XX (b) or (g) GATT. This view may also be supported 
by the decision of the WTO Appellate Body in the Shrimp-Turtle Case20.  
However, given the complexities of the international system, a multilateral approach is 
most likely the only way to advance climate change policies in the field of energy-related 
emissions. The general exception from GATT rules under Article XX should provide 
scope for multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) like the Kyoto Protocol, but not 
for unilateral action on non-product-related standards. The relationship between WTO 
rules and specific trade obligations set out in MEAs, however, is not clearly defined. It is 
subject to negotiations in the forthcoming WTO trade round.21 At least 11 MEAs contain 
trade-related measures.22 To allow for environmental trade measures based on non-
                                                 
19 C. Wofford: A Greener Future at the WTO: The Refinement of WTO Jurisprudence on Environmental Excep-
tions to GATT, Harvard Environmental Law Review 24, (2000), 563-592, p. 583 f. 
20 WTO-Appellate Body, supra, footnote 15; S. Charnovitz: The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: 
Debunking the Myth of Illegality. The Yale Journal of International Law 27(59), (2002), 59-110, p. 95f. 
21 This is part of the Doha Mandate on Trade and Environment as declared at the 4th WTO Ministerial Con-
ference in Doha, November 2001. The Cartagena Protocol is the only MEA so far, which makes a clear 
statement on its status vis-à-vis the WTO in its preamble: "... trade and environment agreements should be 
mutually supportive with a view to achieving sustainable development, [...], the above recital is not intended 
to subordinate this Protocol to other international agreements, [...]" Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (2000). 
22 They include: the Montreal Protocol (1987); the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(1973); the Basel Convention (1989); the International Plant Protection Convention (1951, 1979, 1997); the 
UN Fish Stock Agreement (1995); the International Tropical Timber Agreement (1994); the International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (1966); the Convention on the Conservation on Antarc-
tic Living Marine Resources (1980); the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; the Stockholm Convention on  
  11
product-related PPMs under WTO law, a specific reference in WTO rules to obligations 
under MEAs seems to be the appropriate way. 
The application of standards on the national level does not conflict with WTO law as long 
as it does not discriminate against imported like products. German command and control 
instruments for energy production and consumption are applied to domestic goods and 
production technologies. The regulations apply to domestic and foreign providers of these 
goods alike (e.g. for heating technologies or combustion plants). They are neither designed 
nor applied to discriminate between domestic and foreign products. Also, there is no appli-
cation of non-product-related PPMs to foreign producers. 
 
The regulation of processes and production methods (PPMs) which addresses the polluters 
is an important instrument for climate change policies. The Shrimp-Turtle and the Asbes-
tos Case indicate that standards on PPMs are not per se illegal under WTO law, but rather 
that this legality depends on whether a PPM-standard is based on an environmental ration-
ale and whether its implementation is in line with the basic requirements of the WTO 
law.23 Unilateral standards on PPMs that discriminate for example between electricity im-
ports from single countries based on energy generation technology (e.g. solar or nuclear 
energy) currently seem not to be compatible with WTO regulations. The rationale is that 
international trade rules should be as transparent and as multilaterally accepted as possible, 
and that different process-related standards could run counter to the world trading system, 
since they would force exporters to produce according to different national standards that 
constitute a non-tariff trade barrier. The new German command and control instruments for 
energy production and use do not include these measures. Rather there are a number of 
new tools whose application may be in conflict with WTO rules. We discuss these in the 
following sections. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001) and the Rotterdam Convention (1998). W. Althammer; S. Dröge: Inter-
national Trade and the Environment: the Real Conflicts, in: M. Rauscher et al. (eds.): Environmental Policy 
in an International Perspective, Dordrecht: Kluwer, (2003), Biermann, supra, footnote 15.  
23 Charnovitz, supra, footnote 20, p. 110.  
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4 Labelling   
The ecological labelling of products has a long tradition in Germany, starting with the in-
troduction of the Blue Angel in 1977. The labelling of electricity now plays an increasing 
role in national energy policy due to the existence of two trends. First, one way to achieve 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is the promotion of renewable energy sources. 
Labelling helps to identify these energy sources. Second, electricity markets were liberal-
ised at both the national and international level during the last decade. This has led to a 
concentration of national suppliers and networks through mergers and acquisitions, and to 
increasing competition at the European and international level. As a result, consumers now 
need more information to be able to choose between the different national and foreign 
electricity suppliers available. Labels are a tool to provide this information. Yet, imple-
menting “green” energy labelling at a national level requires a clear procedure based on the 
registration and monitoring of producers’ activities. The control problems increase if the 
labelling of imported power has to be considered too. 
4.1 Definitions   
Ecological labels are an information tool for all kinds of products that helps buyers and 
suppliers distinguish products according to their impact on the environment. They are ei-
ther based on a broad life-cycle analysis or on selected criteria. When talking about eco-
logical labelling, we refer to “the use of labels in order to inform consumers that a product 
is determined by a third party to be environmentally more friendly relative to other prod-
ucts in the same category” as defined by UNCTAD (1994). The International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) distinguishes between three different types of ecological labels, 
but only type I matches the UNCTAD definition: “Type I is the eco-seal awarded as a li-
cense and based on a labelling programme”.24  
Most labelling programmes are voluntary and firms are free to participate if they wish to 
do so. It is important for the purposes of trade law analysis to distinguish between volun-
tary and compulsory labels (see table 1), because this distinction is found in WTO law.25 
                                                 
24 Type II is the self-declaration claim made by producers, importers, and retailers on products and services, 
type III is the report card label, which gives information according to fixed indices, similar to general con-
sumer information on product packages. Cited from OECD: Eco-Labelling: Actual Effects of Selected Pro-
grammes, OECD/GD(97)105, Paris: OECD, (1997), p. 9 f. 
25 See footnote 30.  
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Moreover, voluntary labels can comprise three categories: they can be either governmen-
tal, or private, or quasi-governmental.26  
 
Table 1: Examples of different types of labels 




- Proof of Origin for Electricity 
(Austria)  








- Blue Angel (Germany) 
- Nordic Swan (Sweden) 
- Green Seal USA (USA) 
 
 
Compulsory labels are command and control measures. They require that certain standards 
and regulations are met by producers. Otherwise the label will not be granted and a pro-
ducer will be denied market access. Voluntary labels leave it up to each individual pro-
ducer to choose whether to meet the ecological criteria for a specific programme and to use 
the label for marketing purposes.  
Labels can provide important information on both production processes and direct product 
characteristics. In many cases, ecological programmes attempt to apply life-cycle analyses 
(LCA), which are designed to include all possible information on a product’s environmental 
impacts from “cradle to grave”, e.g. generation of inputs, production processes, waste dis-
posal, and disposal of the product after its use. Most schemes, however, simply pick out cer-
tain environmental effects from production, since in many areas a complete life-cycle as-
sessment is difficult and expensive to conduct.27 
                                                 
26 The EPA (Environmental Protection Agency, US) labels mixed schemes involving governmental agencies 
and NGOs as “quasi-governmental”; for more examples see  WTO-CTE: Information Relevant to the Consid-
eration of the Market Access Effects of Eco-Labelling Schemes, Note by the Secretariat, (29 June 2000), 
WT/CTE/W/150. 
27 G. Mullett: ISO 14000: Harmonizing Environmental Standards and Certification Procedures Worldwide, 
Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 6, (1997), 379-400, p. 383  
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4.2  Application in Germany 
The labelling of the energy consumption of products was introduced in 1998 by the Ener-
gieverbrauchskennzeichnungsgesetz (EnVKG) and the Energieverbrauchskennzeich-
nungsverordnung (EnVKV). In the Blue Angel scheme, energy efficiency has always been 
a criterion for judging the environmental impact of different products. The labelling of 
electricity according to its origin and production became popular with the liberalisation of 
electricity markets, but it is not yet fully established. The German electricity market was 
liberalised in 1998, enabling consumers to choose between different suppliers. Consumers 
can also choose between different “packages”, with varying flat rates and pricing struc-
tures. Following the demand for more information on the origin of electricity, the product 
range is now also being differentiated accordingly. As part of this process, labelling 
schemes have become increasingly important for supplying information on “green” elec-
tricity — stemming from renewable sources like water, sun or wind.  
There is an ongoing debate on the criteria that should be used when setting up a labelling 
programme for “green” electricity. Electricity is a homogenous good that does not incorpo-
rate any characteristics of its production method. In order to attach to the product the en-
ergy generation process as a characteristic, control and certification of different electricity 
sources are necessary. Only this would lead to separate markets for electricity from differ-
ent sources. The criteria for “green” production, i.e. production based on renewable re-
sources, could include: 
-  the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, 
- resource  intensity, 
-  processes and procedures related to the set-up of new capacities (production of solar 
cells, the construction of hydropower stations, etc.). 
Such criteria could be implemented using quotas, for example by setting a share of new 
high-tech power stations in the overall production portfolio of a regular supplier in order to 
tackle greenhouse gas emissions; or by using a range of environmental data for the local 
ecological impact of specific power stations, like hydrostations.  
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For the labelling of electricity, several initiatives by non-governmental organisations ex-
ist.28 They all aim at creating a market for clearly identifiable “green” electricity. However, 
they also include electricity from block-type thermal power stations and other combined 
heat and power stations, which also use non-renewable sources like coal or gas. This is 
justified by the high degree of efficiency of these combined heat and power technologies. 
This example shows that a clear distinction is needed between electricity from renewable 
sources and from non-renewable sources using a higher-than-usual efficient technology. 
Otherwise, labels lead to inconsistencies that do not comply with the labelling criteria 
mentioned. 
Mandatory labelling of energy consumption can be found in the German Energiever-
brauchskennzeichnungsgesetz (EnVKG, Law on Labelling and Limits of Energy Consump-
tion). It stipulates that additional information has to be provided by producers on the con-
sumption of energy and other resources as well as CO2-emissions for all technical devices 
and vehicles. Germany also has to comply with the EU directive 2001/77/EC 
(27.9.2001),which stipulates that EU-members shall ensure that guarantees of origin for 
traded electricity from renewable energy sources can be issued on request. These proof of 
origin certificates are compulsory and have to be introduced by the end of 2003 in all EU 
member countries.  
4.3  Potential Conflicts with WTO Law 
Trade-related impacts of eco-labels or proof of origin are all measures that make market 
entry for foreign firms more costly and foreign products less competitive. The following 
barriers to foreign companies are relevant.  
-  Information. Access for foreign producers to information on voluntary eco-labelling 
schemes, proofs of origin and tradable green certificates in their target markets can be 
a problem.  
-  Standards. Regulations like proof of origin requirements for specific products could 
be applied to domestic and to foreign products in a discriminatory way, e.g. by asking 
foreign suppliers to meet higher labelling standards than domestic suppliers. These bar-
                                                 
28 Examples are “Grünstrom” of the Institut für angewandte Ökologie e.V., Grüner Strom Label by EURO-
SOLAR, BUND, NABU;” Gütezeichen für Ökostrom” of the Öko-Institut/Bremer Energie Konsens.  
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riers can also be indirect. For example, if a label will only be awarded if specific proc-
esses and production methods (PPMs) based on domestic conditions are met, foreign 
firms may be excluded.29 
-  Participation. Foreign firms can face direct barriers to market access, e.g. if a label-
ling or a green certificate scheme explicitly excludes foreign producers. 
There are no explicit trade rules on green product labelling. WTO rules applicable for la-
belling can be found in the TBT Agreement and in the GATT. The TBT Agreement states 
that WTO-members are supposed to co-ordinate the introduction and application of na-
tional standards and technical rules at an international level. Moreover, a system of mutual 
information and consultation exists so as to support the transparency of national measures. 
According to the TBT Agreement, voluntary programmes and their criteria are regarded as 
standards, while mandatory labels fall under the category of technical regulations.30 WTO 
rules are only applicable to those national policies that affect international trade.31 Private 
non-governmental voluntary labelling initiatives cannot be directly addressed via WTO 
mechanisms, because trade distortion alone does not automatically lead to measures under 
WTO law. Such conflicts are an issue for bilateral consultation instead.  
The legal texts do not explicitly refer to labels based on specific programmes, but rather to 
all kinds of labels with product information. Declaring a product as environmentally 
friendly can result from three different but interrelated grounds: product criteria (i.e. con-
sumption externalities), product-related criteria (i.e. externalities stemming from produc-
tion, which are incorporated in the product), and non-product-related criteria (i.e. produc-
                                                 
29 This can cause severe barriers to market access, especially for firms from developing countries. Industrial 
countries´ production standards are not usually relevant for some countries either due to different environ-
mental conditions or due to the actual production technologies. 
30 A technical regulation is a "Document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes 
and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is man-
datory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling 
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method." (Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agree-
ment). A standard is a "Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated 
use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with 
which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method." 
(Annex 1.2 to the TBT Agreement). The explanatory note to Annex 1.2 states that "For the purpose of this 
Agreement standards are defined as voluntary and technical regulations as mandatory documents." 
31 M. Buck, R. Verheyen: International Trade Law and Climate Change – A Positive Way Forward, FES-
Analyse Ökologische Marktwirtschaft, (July 2001), p. 15.  
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tion externalities not incorporated in the final product). Non-product-related issues are es-
pecially relevant for life-cycle analyses. These categories are subject to different treatment 
under WTO law (see section 2.2). Several studies conclude that non-product-related crite-
ria found in ecological labelling programmes are not included in the standards permitted to 
distinguish products under the TBT Agreement.32 This conclusion is based on the negotia-
tion history of the TBT Agreement and on the panel rulings on the term “like products”. 
Nevertheless, as long as there is no explicit ruling that prohibits distinguishing products 
based on non-product-related standards, their violation of the TBT Agreement is an open 
issue. 
Mandatory labelling, as opposed to voluntary labelling, of a product’s process and produc-
tion method is subject to TBT rules33, because mandatory labels are technical regulations 
under the TBT Agreement – regardless of the product to which the labelling applies. TBT 
rules state that technical regulations must involve "treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin" (Article 2.1 TBT Agreement) and that there 
should not be "unnecessary obstacles to international trade" (Article 2.2 TBT Agreement). 
This would mean that rules for proofs of origin for energy suppliers must not discriminate 
against foreign suppliers. 
The investigation into voluntary ecological labelling has to go beyond the TBT Agree-
ment. Do basic GATT-rules apply to those ecological labelling programmes, which are not 
covered by the TBT Agreement? In the Tuna-Dolphin conflict (1991), Mexico felt dis-
criminated by the US “Dolphin-safe” label and referred to Article I GATT (the most-
favoured nation principle). The GATT-panel34, however, rejected this claim on the ground 
that the label was granted irrespective of the country of origin of the canned tuna.35 Thus, 
whether or not a voluntary eco-label contradicts the most-favoured nation principle de-
pends on whether or not one country helps another country to gain advantages from selling 
                                                 
32 See supra, footnote 7. 
33 See supra, footnote 30.  
34 GATT Tuna Panel: United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna; Report of the Panel, 30 ILM 1594 
(1991).  
35 F. Altemöller: Handel und Umwelt im Recht der Welthandelsorganisation WTO. Umweltrelevante Streitfälle 
in der Spruchpraxis zu Artikel III und Artikel XX GATT, Frankfurt am Main, (1998), p. 254; and Chang, supra, 
footnote 7, p. 150.   
  18
the labelled product.36 Therefore the information given by a label on the production 
method (non-product-related PPM) is not relevant for the most-favoured nation clause. 
There have been no explicit statements to date by WTO dispute settlement bodies on Arti-
cle III (4) GATT (the national treatment principle) with respect to trade effects of non-
product-related labelling criteria. However, as already mentioned, decisions have been 
made on the likeness of products (in the Alcoholic Beverages Case and the Asbestos Case). 
In general, identical goods produced with different methods are regarded as "like prod-
ucts". Labels which are designed to differentiate goods using the PPMs would therefore 
not automatically lead to a differentiation in WTO terms. However, this does not generate 
a conflict as long as domestic and foreign like products, as a group, are not treated differ-
ently.37  
If consumers refuse to buy a product, because the country of origin does not apply a certain 
production method, discrimination takes place, but Article III (4) is not applicable. Article 
III (4) also prescribes that equal treatment should comprise "... all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase...". The term 'affect-
ing' has been interpreted very broadly and this term has created scope for non-compliance 
with national treatment obligations under Article III (4) for labels that help to discriminate 
foreign products based on non-product-related PPMs.38 
Nevertheless, even if GATT basic principles were violated, one can always fall back on the 
general exemptions in Article XX GATT. As there has been no conflict over ecological 
labelling so far, the relevance for Article XX GATT has not yet been investigated. 
                                                 
36 Chang, supra, footnote 7, p. 151; C. Tietje: Voluntary Eco-Labelling programmes and Questions of State 
Responsibility in the WTO/GATT Legal System, Journal of World Trade 29(1), (1995), 123-157. The panel did 
not agree that the stated influence of the US-government on application of dolphin-safe products existed and 
therefore could not find that obstruction of the most-favoured nation principle had taken place. Labelling 
criteria were fixed under the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA).  
37 Howse and Tuerk, supra, footnote 9, p. 289. Such a conflict could be observed when tropical timber be-
came subject to a mandatory national label in Austria in 1992, which required sustainable forestry as produc-
tion method. Malaysia felt discriminated by this mandatory label and claimed that application of the criterion 
"sustainable forestry" is not in accordance with Article III (4), because the forestry method used is not a 
characteristic of the wood itself, if this method is not an international standard and it is not applied to other 
types of wood. However, no ruling was made by the panel as Austria and Malaysia managed to find a settle-
ment. Mullet, supra, footnote 27, p. 393; L. Sucharipa-Behrmann: Eco-Labelling Approaches for Tropical 
Timber: The Austrian Experience, in: OECD: Life-Cycle Management and Trade, Paris: OECD, (1994), 55-58, 
p. 56. 
38 Chang, supra, footnote 7, p. 153; Tietje, supra 36, p. 140.  
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It can be concluded that a clear statement on the legality of “green” electricity labelling 
under WTO rules is not possible and that only a dispute settlement procedure would add 
more clarity to this point. Currently, electricity labelling schemes in Germany are not man-
datory. If such initiatives were enacted under public German law, as opposed to by purely 
private initiatives, other countries would be able to challenge them based on the TBT 
Agreement or general GATT principles. However, if no WTO member lodges a complaint, 
the WTO will not intervene.  
The EU-wide introduction of proofs of origin for energy from renewable resources (EU 
directive 2001/77/EC) is mandatory and thus a technical regulation according to WTO 
law. This treatment is independent from the subject of the label, i.e. a proof of origin can 
be demanded for any production method. The requirement to supply a proof of origin con-
forms with WTO law as long as there is no discrimination against suppliers from other 
WTO member countries.  
4.4  Conclusions and Policy Options 
Labels help to inform consumers and other interested parties about the environmental im-
pacts of a product. This tool is becoming popular with non-governmental German actors in 
order to distinguish otherwise homogenous electricity according to the production method 
used. Their major goal is to foster renewable power generation by establishing and broad-
ening markets for "green" electricity. 
A clear distinction has to be made between labels based on labelling programmes and mere 
proofs of origin. There is no reference to ecological labelling in WTO law as such. Its 
compatibility depends instead on the TBT agreement, which deals with standards and tech-
nical regulations, and on the basic principles of the GATT. Mandatory labels are fully cov-
ered by WTO law and their application is allowed as long as there is no discrimination 
against foreign suppliers. It is, however, not clear whether voluntary labels with specific 
emphasis on non-product-related processes and production methods are covered by WTO 
rules. A clarification would only be possible if a complaint was lodged with the dispute 
settlement bodies. Standards on PPMs can cause conflict under WTO law if other WTO 
members feel discriminated. Currently, the resolution of such conflicts would depend on 
the legal interpretation by WTO dispute settlement bodies of non-product-related standards 
and their validity to distinguish otherwise "like" products.  
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A long-term policy perspective for labelling of environmentally friendly electricity genera-
tion should be international co-ordination. This would make compliance of labels with 
international trade rules easier and it would lead to greater transparency in worldwide elec-
tricity production. The concept of a “green single subject label” for electricity production 
methods and the creation of internationally agreed criteria should be further analysed and 
discussed.  
5 Green  Certificates 
5.1 Definition 
Certificates are a crucial tool of international climate policy. The Kyoto Protocol stipulates 
the introduction of internationally tradable CO2 emission rights.39 The concept of green 
certificates is similar to that of tradable pollution permits, the difference being that green 
certificates document the number of electricity units produced in an environmentally 
friendly manner, instead of certifying units of pollution rights.40 The electricity units are 
sold at market rates but producers receive additional revenues from the certificate market. 
Demand for green certificates could be caused by domestic regulation of the energy sector. 
By setting quotas, which determine the share of electricity stemming from renewable re-
sources, producers are forced to either buy certificates from green producers or – guided 
by certificate prices – invest in green technologies and sell green certificates themselves. In 
any case, by introducing green certificates, a government enables producers to meet this 
obligation without immediate changes of production technologies.  
Besides the information on the power units generated, green certificates can be designed to  
-  include information about the type, location and point in time of power generation; 
-  be tradable across suppliers and across national borders. 
                                                 
39 See Buck and Verheyen, supra, footnote 31, for a detailed analysis of WTO-issues related to CO2 emis-
sion trading.  
40 It is an open issue how "green" electricity imports should be taken into account in a country’s GHG-
balance under the Kyoto Protocol. Bräuer et al. find that the co-existence of markets for CO2-emission rights 
and for green certificates will lead to inefficiencies. The option to refinance the emission obligations in either 
the green certificate or the CO2 emission market leads to suboptimal choice of technologies. See W. Bräuer; 
M. Stronzik; A. Michaelowa: Die Koexistenz von Zertifikatemärkten für grünen Strom und CO2- Emissionen 
– wer gewinnt und wer verliert?, HWWA Discussion Paper No. 96, (2000).  
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5.2  Application in Germany 
So far, in Germany no green certification system has been implemented, although these 
certificates are part of the policy debate. Support mechanisms from the Renewable Ener-
gies Act (EEG) have instead been used to foster the production of renewable energy. This 
law guarantees a minimum price per unit of power from renewable sources and allows grid 
operators to buy any amount supplied to them at this price. Thus there is no explicit target-
ing of quantities (see also discussion in section 7).41 However, the current German support 
measures for renewable power generation are also guided by the targets stipulated by the 
European Union White Paper (12 per cent of gross energy consumption in 2012 should 
stem from renewable sources).42 Improved effectiveness in reaching this goal could be 
achieved by green certification, because this enables the targeted amounts to be clearly 
assigned and gives electricity producers incentives to invest in green technologies based on 
the certificate market price. A Europe-wide system of tradable green certificates, the Re-
newable Energy Certificate System (RECS), has been under construction since 1998. The 
participants are members from European energy companies, governments and energy con-
sultants.43  
5.3  Green Certificates and WTO Rules 
As no international green certificate trading system exists at present, it is only possible to 
make some preliminary considerations regarding WTO law.44 The first question would be 
whether green certificates should be regarded as "goods" (or "commodities" or "products") 
under the GATT 1994 or as a "service" under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS 1994). Green certificates are derivatives of the product "electricity" from renew-
able sources. A warranted amount (proportion) of green electricity is subject to trading, but 
the physical power is sold and distributed separately.  
                                                 
41 Regular power suppliers and networks are forced to distribute this “green” energy and the extra costs of 
supporting these technologies are born by consumers (who are charged 0.01 €/kWh extra for all electricity). 
An example of how the share of specific “green” energy can be calculated is given in Öko-Mitteilungen: 
Informationen aus dem Institut für angewandte Ökologie e.V., No. 3+4, (1999), p. 7. 
42 See European Commission: Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy, White Paper for a 
Community Strategy and Action Plan, COM(97)599 final, (1997).  
43 "RECS provides a mechanism for representing a specific instance of the production of a megawatt hour of 
renewable electricity by a unique certificate which can be transferred from owner to owner before being used 
as proof of generation, or exchanged for financial support." See <http://www.platts.com/features/ 
greencertificates> and <http://www.recs.org>.  
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If one assumes that tradable green certificates can be treated as products under the GATT, 
the basic principles for trade in goods apply: most-favoured nation treatment and national 
treatment. However, tradable green certificates may also be considered as falling under the 
GATS. According to Article I of the GATS there are four modes of supply: cross-border 
supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence and the temporary movement of natural 
persons.45 The approach to the liberalisation of services in the GATS is based on a list of 
commitments in specific sectors. If a country does not put a sector on this list, it is not will-
ing to negotiate on any of the four foreseen modes of market access for this specific topic. 
Energy supply and related issues such as green certificates are currently not listed by any 
WTO member. If trade in green certificates were to be listed under GATS, basic trade prin-
ciples - as under the GATT - would apply: most-favoured nation treatment (Article II 
GATS), market access (Article XVI) and national treatment (Article XVII) for "like ser-
vices" of any other member country. 
Under both GATT and GATS rules, it is relevant how a national certificate trading systems 
regulates the access for foreign and domestic competitors. Compliance with WTO rules is 
not fulfilled if quantitative restrictions on trade for foreign sellers of certificates exist or if 
domestic market access is regulated in a discriminatory way against providers from differ-
ent countries. Therefore, if the design of a national and international system for tradable 
green certificates is to comply with WTO rules, either mutual recognition of national cer-
tificates and their underlying criteria for renewable energy sources, or harmonisation of 
national systems is needed.  
6 Taxes   
6.1 Definition   
Economic theory differentiates between ecological taxes (or charges) on production or 
consumption and taxes (or charges) on pollution. The concept of taxing emissions and in-
ternalising externalities was first suggested by Arthur C. Pigou.46 However, the 
implementation of a Pigouvian tax requires a substantial amount of information in order to 
determine the optimal level of pollution. Therefore, today’s ecological taxes are generally 
based on the Price-Standard-Approach (PSA). This assumes that the desired level of                                                                                                                                                      
44 For a similar discussion on the trading of emission rights see Buck and Verheyen, supra, footnote 31. 
45 Article I: 2 (a) to (d) GATS.  
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the Price-Standard-Approach (PSA). This assumes that the desired level of environmental 
quality is determined in the political process.47  
With respect to energy policy, one can differentiate between a tax on primary energy con-
sumption and a tax on final energy. The former is more preferable, because it creates in-
centives for improving energy efficiency at all levels of the energy transformation process. 
However, without international harmonisation, the introduction of such a tax on primary 
energy would be difficult to realise, because domestic final energy could be easily substi-
tuted by imported final energy.48 
In general, taxation is widely seen as a cost-effective instrument for reducing carbon diox-
ide emissions—some even see a potential for energy taxes to become the main pillar of 
fiscal systems in the 21st century.49 Energy taxes allow for the inclusion of the long-term 
costs of climate change into the price system and thus balance the private costs of carbon 
dioxide emissions with the environmental and social costs of global warming. A number of 
countries, mainly in northern Europe, have already implemented energy or carbon taxes in 
the context of broader ecological tax reforms. 
6.2  Application in Germany 
In 1999, the First Step Toward an Ecological Tax Reform Act came into force in Germany. 
The Ecological Tax Reform (ETR) has two objectives: first, lowering energy consumption 
and improving energy efficiency, which could eventually lead to a reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions, and second, redistributing tax revenues to the social security system, which 
could lead to more employment.50  
                                                                                                                                                    
46 A.C. Pigou: The Economics of Welfare, London: Macmillan, (1932). 
47 W. Baumol, M. Oates: The Use of Standards and Prices for Environmental Protection, Swedish Journal 
of Economics 73, (1971), 42-54. 
48 S. Bach, M. Kohlhaas, B. Meyer, B. Praetorius, H. Welsch: The effects of environmental fiscal reform in 
Germany: a simulation study, Energy Policy 30, (2002), 803-811, p. 804 
49 T. Barker: Limits of the Tax Approach for Mitigating Global Warming, in: J. Hacker, A. Pelchen (eds.): 
Goals and Economic Instruments for the Achievement of Global Warming Mitigation in Europe (= Proceedings 
of the EU Advanced Study Course held in Berlin, Germany, Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer, (July 1997), 
239-251, p. 239 
50 This corresponds to the concept of the “double-dividend”, see M. Kohlhaas: The German Ecological Tax 
Reform, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Economic Stud-
ies Program Series 6, (2000). For a simulation study see Bach et al., supra, footnote 48.   
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As a first step, the German government increased the existing tax on gasoline, heating fuel, 
diesel fuel, and natural gas and introduced a new tax on electricity. There is, however, no 
environmental tax on coal which is the most carbon-intensive primary energy source. From 
2000 to 2003 four more steps of the ETR followed, with yearly increases of the tax rate for 
gasoline and electricity. The government also allowed for compensations and reductions 
for some groups.51 Energy from renewable sources is exempt from the ecological tax, as 
long as it is either used by the producer himself or is supplied to an electricity grid that is 
exclusively fed by renewable sources. 
6.3  Implementation Problems of Environmental Taxes 
The implementation of national environmental taxes is not obstructed by any WTO rules as 
long as imports from WTO member countries are taxed in the same way as domestic 
goods. Implementation problems are rather a matter of resistance from domestic industry, 
which has often resulted in adjustment measures such as special exemptions or rebates for 
certain sectors.52 In many countries, the domestic opposition to the introduction of energy 
taxes is based on the perception that energy taxes would affect the international competi-
tiveness of national industries.53 Whether a loss in competitiveness can be empirically sup-
ported, or whether it is merely based on the perception of the potential “victims” of a tax 
proposal, in many cases energy taxation is seen as a major threat to domestic industries, 
and it has triggered strong political opposition in the past and is likely to continue to do so 
                                                 
51 OECD and International Energy Agency IEA: Dealing with Climate Change. Policies and Measures in IEA 
Member Countries, Paris: OECD, (2001), p. 85; BMF – Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Achtzehnter Subven-
tionsbericht. Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Entwicklung der Finanzhilfen des Bundes und der Steuer-
vergünstigungen für die Jahre 1999 – 2002, Berlin, (2001a), p. 25. 
52 OECD: Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries. Issues and Strategies, Paris: OECD, (2001a). 
53 The debate includes the scenario of firms relocating to so-called pollution havens. For an empirical analy-
sis see A. B. Jaffe, S. R. Peterson, P. R. Portney, R. N. Stavins: Environmental Regulation and the Competitive-
ness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell us?, Journal of Economic Literature 33(1), (1995), 
132-163.  
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in the future.54 Political pressure from industry could thus become a serious danger for 
national climate protection strategies.55  
One option to offset these – real or perceived – competitive impacts caused by energy 
taxes is a properly designed and internationally agreed upon border tax adjustment (BTA) 
which would not undermine the environmental objective of reducing carbon dioxide emis-
sions.56 Although this instrument plays only a minor role in the current debate on climate 
policy it might be an attractive solution for the competitiveness problem mentioned above. 
We therefore discuss this instrument and its eligibility under WTO law in the following.57  
6.4  Border Tax Adjustment 
6.4.1  Definition and Application 
Border tax adjustments have traditionally been motivated by economic reasons, not by 
ecological problems. Theoretically, there are two concepts for where to levy a tax on 
traded goods. First, the destination principle stipulates that goods should be taxed in the 
country of consumption.58 Each country is allowed to choose its own domestic tax regime, 
                                                 
54 Finland provides a good example. As the first country ever to introduce a carbon tax, Finland did not grant 
any tax reductions or exemptions to industry until concerns about competitiveness forced the government to 
change its tax scheme, see G. Teir: Environmental Energy Taxes: The Experience of Finland, in: OECD: Envi-
ronmental Taxes, Recent Developments in China and OECD Countries, Paris: OECD, (1999), 303-308. These 
concerns also accompanied the introduction of the German ETR, see e.g. C. Krebs, D. Reiche: Der Einstieg in 
die Ökologische Steuerreform: Aufstieg, Restriktion und Durchsetzung eines umweltpolitischen Themas, Frank-
furt: Peter Lang, (1999). 
55 In some cases, strong opposition from industry leads to the complete failure of energy tax proposals. The 
US BTU tax, Australia’s “Greenhouse Levy” and New Zealand’s proposal for a “Low Level Carbon Charge” 
are examples for the impediment of climate change policy by industry, see e.g. R. Baron: Carbon and Energy 
Taxes in OECD Countries, in: J. Hacker; A. Pelchen (eds.): Goals and Economic Instruments for the Achieve-
ment of Global Warming Mitigation in Europe: Proceedings of the EU Advanced Study Course held in Berlin, 
Germany, Dordrecht: Kluwer, (July 1997), 207-229. 
56 The DISC case is an example for the harmonisation problem. US producers had claimed that the introduc-
tion of a comprehensive system of indirect taxes in the European Communities allowed their member states 
to make more border tax adjustments. This, so the argument of the US producers, would create a competitive 
disadvantage for them, since the United States had a tax system that was based on direct taxation rather than 
on indirect taxation. Therefore, the US DISC legislation of 1971 introduced a partial exemption for direct 
taxes on exported products. It followed a dispute, initiated by the European Economic Community. One 
finding in the DISC case was that the US legislation granted a subsidy to export and therefore contradicted 
GATT rules. This can be seen as a further confirmation of the ineligibility of direct taxes for border adjust-
ment. See BISD – Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (GATT/WTO): The DISC case, 2 November 
1976, BISD 23S/98 (1977). 
57 For a detailed discussion see also F. Biermann, R. Brohm: Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Without the 
United States: The Strategic Role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, Global Governance Working Paper 
No 5, Potsdam, Berlin, Oldenburg, (2003). 
58 See for example J. H. Jackson: The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Rela-
tions, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, (1989).  
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and products from all countries are still able to compete in the international market. The 
universal—that is, internationally harmonised—application of the destination principle 
thus levels out the competitive basis for all countries: exported or imported products are 
neither exposed to double taxation, nor do they compete on different competitive terms 
arising from different national tax levels. The second principle is the origin principle, 
which requires that products are taxed in the country of production. If the origin principle 
was internationally accepted and taxes were harmonised, border tax adjustments would not 
be necessary.  
In the context of discussions on the harmonisation of indirect taxes in the European Eco-
nomic Community59, GATT established a Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments in 
1968 which delivered a final report in 1970.60 The GATT Working Party opted for the des-
tination principle, defining border tax adjustments as: “any fiscal measures which put into 
effect, in whole or in part, the destination principle (i.e. which enable exported products to 
be relieved of some or all of the tax charged in the exporting country in respect of similar 
domestic products sold to consumers on the home market and which enable imports sold to 
consumers to be charged with some or all of the tax charged in the importing country in 
respect of similar domestic products)”.61 This definition of BTA still represents the pre-
vailing view within the WTO system.62 
Examples of border tax adjustments with an environmental aspect can be found in the Su-
perfund tax scheme and the Ozone Depleting Chemicals tax scheme, both enacted in the 
United States. The Superfund tax was introduced in the United States in 1986 as a prior-
stage specific tax on listed chemicals, which were used as inputs for the further production 
of chemical derivatives. It was challenged before a GATT panel by the European Commu-
nity.63  
                                                 
59 K. W. Dam: The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization; Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, (1970), p. 213. 
60 GATT Document L/3464, 2 December 1970, see supra, BISD 18S/97, footnote 10. 
61 BISD 18S/97, supra, footnote 10, para. 4. 
62 WTO-CTE: Taxes and Charges for Environmental Purposes-Border Tax Adjustment, Note by the Secre-
tariat, (2 May 1997). WTO Document WT/CTE/W/47, (1997a), para. 28 
63 BISD - Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (GATT/WTO): Report of the GATT Panel. United 
States: Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, (17 June 1987), BISD 34S/136.  
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However, the GATT panel only examined how the tax was applied, and not for which po-
litical purpose. Since the US imposed the tax directly, it was considered to be eligible for a 
BTA.64 Additionally, the Superfund Case dealt with inputs that were physically incorpo-
rated in the product, while energy is consumed during the production process. This makes 
the case of energy more complicated (see also below). 
The US Ozone Depleting Chemicals (ODC) Tax was introduced to implement the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.65 It represented a tax on the domes-
tic consumption of certain ozone depleting chemicals, either directly or indirectly through 
the consumption of products which were manufactured using the ODCs. Furthermore, the 
ODC tax applied to substances used in the production process that were not physically 
incorporated in the final product.66  
The border tax adjustment of the ODC tax was quite effective in protecting the domestic 
ODC industry from foreign competitors, while also allowing a gradual phasing-out of 
ODCs in US industry. It established the importance of border tax adjustments in the con-
text of taxes with an environmental purpose.67 So far, no country has claimed that adjust-
ment of taxes on ODCs when imported to the United States violates GATT or WTO regu-
lations.68 
6.4.2  Border Tax Adjustments Under WTO Law 
When investigating whether WTO law restricts the implementation of border tax adjust-
ments on energy taxes, one needs to consider different provisions and principles of the 
WTO framework.  WTO rules differ for imports and exports, and no regulations specifi-
cally deal with border tax adjustments.  
                                                 
64 C. Pitschas: GATT/WTO Rules for Border Tax Adjustments and the Proposed European Directive Introduc-
ing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 24, 
(1995), 479-500, p. 492. 
65 D. Brack, M. Grubb, and C. Windram: International Trade and Climate Change Policies; London: 
Earthscan, (2000), p. 78-9. 
66 Ibid., p. 12. 
67 Brack et al., supra, footnote 65,  p. 79. 
68 This, as Hoerner remarks, is naturally not conclusive, because the tax on embodied ODCs is usually rather 
small compared to the price of the traded good. See A.J. Hoerner: The Role of Border Tax Adjustments in 
Environmental Taxation: Theory and U.S. Experience, Working Paper, presented at the International Work- 
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A number of possible systems for border tax adjustment are clearly not acceptable under 
WTO law. First, direct taxes—such as income taxes or social welfare charges for produc-
ers—are not eligible for adjustment under the GATT, whereas indirect taxes—that is, taxes 
on products—are eligible. This distinction between direct and indirect taxation, which fol-
lows from the prevailing destination principle in the WTO system, has been generally ac-
cepted as the basis for GATT/WTO provisions on border tax adjustments with respect to 
both imports and exports.69 Thus, only indirect taxes are eligible for adjustment in accor-
dance with the destination principle. This is embodied in different GATT/WTO provisions 
and has also been confirmed by a GATT panel in the context of the US Domestic Interna-
tional Sales Corporations (DISC) legislation in the 1970s.70 
Energy taxes clearly are indirect taxes. WTO law remains unclear about the eligibility of 
indirect taxes for adjustment. This applies particularly in the case of indirect taxes that are 
indirectly applied to end products. This method of taxation includes input or process re-
lated “prior-stage” taxes on physical inputs, on energy or on other parts of the production 
process. The 1970 Working Party on border tax adjustment could not reach a consensus on 
categorising “taxes occultes”—including taxes on advertising, energy, machinery and 
transport—, i.e. their eligibility for border tax adjustments could not be determined.71 
Article II (2) GATT only refers to taxes applied “directly or indirectly” to the product, 
which in principle does not exclude inputs at different stages of the production process. 
Article II (2) (a) further states that “... a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed con-
sistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like domestic 
product or in respect of an article from which the imported product has been manufac-
tured in whole or in part”. The use of the word “article” may indicate that the indirect tax 
is construed as being restricted to products that are physically incorporated into the final 
product. However, the provision does not answer the question clearly. Article VI (4) with 
its wording “borne by products” is as equally vague concerning exports as Article II (2).  
                                                                                                                                                    
shop on Market Based Instruments and International Trade of the Institute for Environmental Studies Am-
sterdam, (19 March 1998), p.12 fn 41, at: <www.sustainableeconomy.org/bta.pdf.> 
69 WTO-CTE 1997a, supra, footnote 62, para. 31; Dam, supra, footnote 59; BISD 18S/97, supra, footnote 
10, para. 8; See also P. Demaret; R. Stewardson: Border Tax Adjustments under GATT and EC Law and 
General Implications for Environmental Taxes, Journal of World Trade 28(4), (1994), 5-65. p. 16. 
70 See Biermann and Brohm, supra, footnote 57. 
71 BISD 18S/97, supra, footnote 10, para. 15 a.  
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The interpretation of measures related to prior-stage inputs and PPMs can also be explored 
in related panel decisions. The panel report on the US-Superfund Case decided that taxes 
on “materials” that were used for the manufacture of domestic products may be taken into 
account when imposing border tax adjustments on imported like products. The panel did 
not, however, indicate whether the chemicals were physically incorporated in the final 
product in any recognisable way.  
The 1979 SCM Code is also relevant for border tax adjustments on exports and refers in 
paragraph (g) of its Annex to “the exemption or remission in respect of the production and 
distribution of exported products of indirect taxes”, which is generally permitted. The re-
mission of prior-stage cumulative taxes on goods or services used in the production of 
products is, as stated in paragraph (h), only permitted if the taxes are levied on goods that 
are physically incorporated in the exported product. It remains unclear whether energy 
taxes fall under the provision for prior-stage cumulative taxes. The 1994 ASCM slightly 
changed the impetus behind these provisions. Under Annex II ASCM it is now allowed 
that countries remit taxes on exports, if the taxes are prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes 
on inputs. Footnote 61 defines these inputs as “physically incorporated, energy, fuels and 
oil used in the production process and catalysts which are consumed in the course of their 
use to obtain the exported product.”72 This seems to change how the eligibility of energy 
taxes for border tax adjustments can be interpreted and may point to the conclusion that an 
indirect tax on a production input would be eligible for adjustment, if the inputs included 
energy, fuels or oil that were used or consumed in the production process.73 However, 
whether footnote 61 clearly allows for BTA on energy is subject to ongoing discussions.74  
6.5  Conclusions and Policy Options 
The introduction of energy taxes has faced substantial resistance from industry in many 
countries, frequently resulting in adjustment measures such as special exemptions or re-
bates for certain sectors. In general, taxes are compatible with WTO rules as long as there 
is no discrimination between domestic and foreign products. This section focused on bor-
der tax adjustments for energy taxes which could be used to offset potential competitive 
                                                 
72 WTO-Committee on Trade and Environment CTE: Negotiating History of Footnote 61 of the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the Secretariat, WT/CTE/W/16, (1995). 
73 See also Demaret and Stewardson, supra, footnote 69, p. 31.  
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disadvantages without watering down the environmental tax objectives, e.g. the reduction 
of carbon dioxide emissions. However, a broader discussion about the feasibility of border 
tax adjustments in the context of energy taxes has not yet taken place. 
We found that it is not entirely clear whether border tax adjustments for energy taxes are 
permitted under world trade law. We can only identify the acceptability of conceivable 
systems for border tax adjustments in general. Direct taxes are clearly not eligible for ad-
justment under GATT, whereas indirect taxes are eligible. This distinction follows on from 
the prevailing destination principle in the WTO system and has been generally accepted as 
a basis for WTO provisions on border tax adjustments. The eligibility of indirect taxes for 
adjustment, however, remains unclear when indirect taxes are indirectly applied to end 
products. This is particularly relevant for energy as an input that is no longer physically 
present in the final product. There is only one point that could support the conclusion that 
energy taxes would in general be eligible for border tax adjustment: the provision in the 
1994 ASCM that a country is allowed to remit taxes on exports for prior-stage cumulative 
indirect taxes on inputs “physically incorporated, energy, fuels and oil used in the produc-
tion process”.  
However, concerning the eligibility of such adjustments much will depend on actual state 
practice, as this is crucial in determining the interpretation of the treaties, as well as on 
decisions by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Given the importance of climate 
change policy for world trade and the remaining ambiguity in WTO law, it would be desir-
able for governments to initiate a process to reach a multilateral understanding on the per-
missibility of border tax adjustments for energy taxation and also for other inputs that are 
not physically incorporated in the final product. Further analyses and discussion is needed 
in order to find international agreement on how to proceed in this direction.  
7 Subsidies 
7.1 Definition 
From the economic perspective a subsidy can be defined, in a broad sense, as an economic 
benefit received by a private agent from public funds at no cost or below the costs of pro-
ducing the benefit. In a more narrow sense, subsidies can be understood as financial assis-
                                                                                                                                                    
74 Ibid., p. 29 ff; WTO-CTE (1995), supra, footnote 72.   
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tance (e.g. direct payments, tax exemptions) from the government to the private sector. All 
economic definitions of subsidies have one common characteristic: a benefit is conferred 
from the public to the private sector. Subsidies have long been used to regulate the econ-
omy as well as to promote national policies. All countries use subsidies as a policy instru-
ment. A subsidy is not compatible with the idea of making polluters pay for environmental 
damage. However, if properly designed and applied, subsidies may contribute to an im-
provement of the environment in the long run.75 Hence, the political definitions of the PPP 
used by the OECD (1974, Annex II) and the European Union (Article 175 (5) European 
Treaty) state that because of other policy goals subsidies may be temporarily permitted.76  
Additionally, the Commission allows for tax exemptions77 in the energy sector, if such 
exemptions are limited in time and are necessary for the implementation of an ecological 
tax system within a member country.78 Furthermore, the Commission allows state aids, 
which seek to support renewable energy sources and combined heat and power generation 
(Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung).79  
7.2  Application in Germany 
In Germany, the consumers and producers of energy are supported through direct pay-
ments, price guarantees, and tax exemptions. The Renewable Energies Act (Erneuerbare-
Energien-Gesetz, EEG), which entered into force in April 2000, introduced a system of 
financial aid for power generation from renewable energy sources. The EEG  aims at 
achieving a 12% share for electricity produced from renewable energy sources by 2010. 
The Act provides price guarantees for the producers of renewable energy, like hydrody-
namic power, landfill gas, firedamp, sewage gas, biomass energy, geothermal energy, wind 
energy, and solar radiation energy. Grid operators are compelled by law to remunerate the 
producers using the prices fixed in §§ 4 to 8 EEG. The additional costs have to be borne by 
the grid operators and will, at least in the long run, be passed on to consumers. The Euro-
                                                 
75 See for a detailed discussion H.-J. Kim: Subsidy, polluter pays principle and financial assistance among 
countries. Journal of World Trade 34(6), 2000, 115-141. 
76 OECD, supra, footnote 52, p. 11; European Commission: Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environ-
mental Protection, Official Journal of the European Communities No. C037; 03/02/2001; 0003-0015, (2001), 
p. 6. 
77 Tax exemptions are considered to be subsidies by Article 87 of the EU-Treaty. 
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pean Court of Justice found the EEG not to be a subsidisation in the sense of European 
law, since there was no involvement of the state and private and public enterprises are 
treated equally.80 However, as we shall see in section 7.3 the price support mechanisms in 
the EEG might be relevant in the context of the WTO definition of a subsidy.  
Similarly, the Co-Generation Act (Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungsgesetz, KWKG) is a law pro-
moting the use of the combined production of heat and power. The KWKG stipulates guar-
anteed prices for electricity to be paid by the grid operators to the energy producers of heat 
and power. The New Co-Generation Act, which entered into force on 1
st April 2002, pro-
tects the existing combined heat and power energy production plants.  
Furthermore, the German Ecological Tax reform (ETR) includes a series of tax reductions, 
as pressure groups had complained about the burden and continue to do so. The German 
government decided to reduce this burden from the ETR for energy-intensive sectors, 
commuters, public transport and low-income households. Exemptions from the taxes on 
petroleum products, which were already in effect before the ETR entered into force, were 
prolonged (e.g. for transport by air and ship). As a result now mainly private households, 
the retail sector, the road transport sector, service companies, public institutions and small 
enterprises pay the full ecological tax rate. The variety of exemptions may lower the effect 
of structural change in favour of the less energy-intensive sectors.81 The ETR also provides 
funds for subsidies for energy production plants based on renewable energy sources. In 
2002, these transfers amounted to 200 million Euro.82   
7.3  Potential Conflicts with WTO Law 
In principle, the WTO law follows a “non-subsidization” approach, although there are de-
tailed rules on the different kinds of national subsidies. These rules include Article XVI 
GATT and the ASCM.83 Article XVI (1) GATT states that in cases of subsidisation, in-
                                                 
80 ECJ – European Court of Justice: Case C-379/98 from (13 March 2001). 
81 Bach et al., supra, footnote 48, p. 811. 
82 BMU – Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (Ed.): Entwicklung der Erneuer-
baren Energien – aktueller Sachstand, Umweltpolitik des BMU, Berlin, (2002), p. 15. 
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cluding income or price supports, “which operate[s] directly or indirectly to increase ex-
ports of any product form, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory”, the con-
tracting parties must be notified. According to the ASCM a subsidy can either be a benefit-
conferring financial contribution from public funds or a benefit-conferring price or income 
support.  
According to the ASCM, subsidies can be classified into three categories: 
- prohibited  subsidies, 
- actionable  subsidies, 
- non-actionable  subsidies. 
In order to facilitate the classification of subsidies, a distinction between “specific” and 
“non-specific” subsidies is introduced in Article 2 ASCM. Subsidies are considered spe-
cific, if they are formally or actually targeted at certain specific enterprises, at groups of 
enterprises, at industries, or at enterprises in a certain region. If a subsidy is specific, it is 
either prohibited or actionable. According to Article 3, prohibited subsidies are non-
agricultural subsidies based, in law or in fact, on export performance, or subsidies contin-
gent, in law or in fact, upon the use of domestic over imported goods. Actionable subsi-
dies, as defined in Article 5 and 6, are specific subsidies which cause “adverse effects to 
the interests of other Members” either 
-  by injuring the domestic industry of another Member; or 
-  by nullifying or impairing the benefits accruing, directly or indirectly, to other Members 
of the GATT; or 
-  by seriously prejudicing the interests of another Member. 
The latter case may arise if the subsidy displaces or hinders imports of like products into 
the member market where the subsidisation takes place (Article 6). 
All other subsidies are non-specific. Non-specific subsidies, if duly notified, are non-
actionable (Article 8). They cannot be challenged under the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism and are not subject to countervailing measures. However, if a non-actionable 
subsidy (as defined in Article 8.2) causes “serious adverse effects to the domestic indus-
try” of a member state which are “difficult to repair” (Article 9.1), member states are ex- 
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pected to negotiate a mutually satisfactory solution. If no such solution can be found, the 
case can be referred to the Committee on Subsidies (Article 9.3).  
In general, environmental subsidies were regarded as non-actionable subsidies during the 
Uruguay Round.84 Nevertheless, the exemption for environmental subsidies, which had 
been agreed upon and was part of the ASCM (Article 8.2(c)) until 1999, has not been re-
newed. The OECD interprets this as “an indication that current environmental subsidies 
have little effect on international trade”.85 Even if environmental subsidies may fall under 
the category of actionable subsides, there are possible exemptions, e.g. the application of 
border tax adjustments including the remission of tax on exported goods.86 
The first issue to be addressed is whether the German price guarantees for producers of 
renewable energy (EEG and KWK laws) have to be regarded as a subsidy at all under 
WTO law.87 This would be the case, if the three criteria legally defining a subsidy are sat-
isfied:  
1)  There must be a financial contribution by government or any form of income or price 
support (satisfying the conditions specified in Article 1.1(a)(1) or 1.1(a)(2) ASCM).  
2)  A benefit has to be conferred (Article 1.1(b) ASCM). 
3)  The measure must be specific (Article 2 ASCM). 
 
ad 1) In order to qualify as a subsidy according to Article 1.1(a)(1), a financial contribution 
by a government is required. However, the payments to electricity producers using renew-
able sources are a financial contribution by the grid operators and not by the government. 
Thus, the EEG and the KWKG do not meet the requirement of Article 1 (a) (1) first sen-
tence. This judgement is in line with the recent ruling of the panel on United States - 
                                                 
84 OECD: The Polluter-Pays Principle as it Relates to International Trade. A Preliminary Study; 
COM/ENV/TD(2001)44, Paris: OECD, (2001b), p. 13. 
85 Ibid., p. 14. 
86 Ibid., p. 14. 
87 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has found the EEG not to be a state aid under European law. Cp. 
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540.  
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measures treating export restraints as subsidies88. The report argues that “… by introduc-
ing the notion of a financial contribution, the drafters [of the ASCM] foreclosed the possi-
bility of the treatment of any government action that resulted in a benefit as a subsidy.”89 
McGovern comes to a similar conclusion: "The requirement of a financial contribution 
reflects an intention not to include in the notion of subsidy all governmental measures con-
ferring benefits."90  
The measures of the EEG, however, might still be considered an income or price support 
under 1.1(a)(2) ASCM. According to McGovern the definitions of income or price sup-
ports have not received much attention. Only in 1960, a GATT panel pronounced that a 
loss to the government must be given, i.e. a guaranteed price paid by a government for a 
product would be a subsidy within the terms of Article XVI.91 Grave arrives at a similar 
conclusion. He argues that the contracting parties of the GATT 1947 assumed that income 
and price support requires the use of government resources.92 However, the price guaran-
tees under the EEG and KWKG are not granted to producers by the government. Rather, 
the government forces two independent private actors to strike a deal at predetermined 
prices, if certain conditions prevail. Therefore the German approach to promote renewable 
energy production does not fall under the WTO definition of subsidies according to Article 
1 (a)(2) ASCM. 
We may therefore conclude, that the provisions in the EEG and the KWKG for supporting 
power generation from renewable energy sources do not meet the criteria for a subsidy as 
specified in Article 1.1(a)(1) or (2).  
Notwithstanding such considerations Slotboom argues, that the German way of supporting 
renewable energy generation is very likely to fulfil the five criteria of Article 1(a)(1)(iv). 
He claims that 
a)  "the government entrusts or directs" (in the EEG and KWKG), 
                                                 
88 WT/DS194/R, 2001, par. 8.65. 
89 WT/DS194/R, 2001, par. 8.38 
90 E. McGovern: International Trade Regulation, Exeter: Globefield Press, looseleaf, (2002), p. 11.31-3 (issue 
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91 Ibid., p. 11.34. 
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b)  "a private body" (the producers of conventional energy), 
c)  "to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) [of Article 1 
(a)(1)]" (buying electricity at higher than the real economic value), 
d)  "which would normally be vested in the government and"  
e)  "the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by govern-
ments" (promoting the use of renewable sources of energy through buying electricity 
for a higher than the real economic value is an activity normally vested in the govern-
ment and the practice does not differ from practices normally followed by govern-
ments).93 
Slotboom concludes that government measures such as those applied in the EEG and 
KWKG "would most likely be considered potentially prohibited or actionable subsidies 
within the meaning of the SCM agreement."94  
With respect to Slotboom’s conclusions several points are worth noting. First, it is unclear 
why the subsidy should be considered potentially prohibited. Even in the event that the 
German price guarantees for renewable energy would be found to constitute a subsidy un-
der WTO law, it is unclear whether they would be regarded as specific subsidies under the 
ASCM (Article 1 and 2 ASCM).95 Specific subsidies can either be prohibited or action-
able. As these subsidies are neither based on export performance nor contingent upon the 
use of domestic over imported goods, they are not prohibited (Art. 3 ASCM). Second, sub-
sidies would become actionable if they injured the domestic industry of another WTO 
Member (Art 5 ASCM). It is unlikely that the present level of international trade in renew-
able energy will cause such damage. Third, promoting the use of renewable energy sources 
through buying electricity for a higher than the economic value is an activity which is 
normally not vested in the government. Fourth and most important, there is no financial 
contribution from government or any public body within the territory of a member state. 
As we have shown above, not all government measures conferring benefits are considered 
a subsidy. 
These arguments point to the conclusion that Slotboom’s judgement should be treated with 
due care and that the price guarantees under the EEG and KWKG should not be considered 
a subsidy under WTO law.  
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94 Slotboom, supra, footnote 87, p. 539-540 
95 See point 3) on specificity below.  
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ad 2) In order to qualify for a subsidy according to Article 1.1(b) a governmental measure 
requires that “a benefit is thereby conferred”. There is no definition of the term benefit in 
the ASCM or any other WTO agreement.96 WTO past rulings indicate that a benefit exists 
when the measure by the government makes the recipient ‘better off’ than otherwise, i.e. as 
determined by the marketplace.97 In the case of the EEG and KWKG a benefit is conferred 
to the recipient because the grid operators are required to remunerate the price fixed by law 
which is higher then the market price. 
ad 3) According to Article 2.1 (a) ASCM specificity requires that the measure of the gov-
ernment is granted selectively in law or in fact to an enterprise or industry or group of en-
terprises or industries (referred to in the ASCM as “certain enterprises”)98. Article 16.1 
ASCM defines an industry as the domestic producers as a whole of the like products.99 It 
seems obvious that the producers of energy from renewable sources should be considered 
an industry and that therefore the funding under the EEG and KWKG should be considered 
specific. However, Article 2.1 (b) ASCM specifies an exception to this rule relevant in this 
case. If the legislation, on which the granting authority bases its operations, establishes 
objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, 
and if the eligibility is automatic and the criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to, 
specificity shall not exist according to Article 2.1 (b) ASCM. These conditions are cer-
tainly satisfied by the EEG and KWKG and render the financial support therefore non-
specific. However, Article 2.1 (c) ASCM specifies an exception to this exception (or a 
counter-exception)100 which might also be relevant in this case. “If, notwithstanding any 
appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of the principles laid down in 
subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be spe-
cific, other factors may be considered.” Among the factors listed in the next sentence are 
the predominant use by certain enterprises and the granting of disproportionately large 
amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises.  It can be argued that this is the case for the EEG 
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and the KWKG. Although even private households are eligible to benefit from the finan-
cial compensation specified in the EEG, disproportionately large amounts of the financial 
flow may go to enterprises. Obviously this judgement depends on the definition of the term 
“disproportionately large amounts”. In our view, Article 2.1 ASCM leaves substantial 
room for interpretation when applied to the EEG and KWKG. Therefore, it is difficult to 
judge whether specificity prevails according to Article 2.1 ASCM.  
Hence, in the case of the EEG and the KWKG only one of the three conditions necessary 
to establish the existence of a subsidy is satisfied, namely the conferring of a benefit. The 
requirement of a financial contribution is not met, and it is unclear, whether specificity 
prevails in this case. Therefore the price support schemes under the EEG and KWKG can-
not be classified as subsidies under WTO law. 
Unlike the price guarantees, the financial transfers and tax exemptions under the ETR must 
be considered subsidies according to Art. 1 ASCM. They are specific subsidies, as they are 
targeted to groups of enterprises and/or to industries. However, as they are not based on 
export performance or the use of domestic over imported goods, they are not prohibited. 
They may, however, be actionable, if they cause an adverse effect to the interests of other 
members as specified in Art. 5 ASCM. Whether such an adverse effect exists cannot be 
determined precisely. Presently, it seems unlikely that the financial transfers and tax ex-
emptions under the ETR will harm other member states` industries.   
So far, no complaints have been made by WTO members about German price guarantees 
and financial transfers for renewable energy or about the tax exemptions under the ETR. It 
seems unlikely that this will happen in the near future because trade in electricity from 
renewable sources has to date only a small share in overall German electricity production. 
Moreover, the support provided by the EEG, KWKG and ETR is not directed at exports or 
imports, but at the production methods used by domestic firms. Potential conflicts could 
arise, if electricity imports of renewable origin put competitive pressure on the German 
market for electricity from renewable sources and on grid operators, or, if an over-capacity 
existed, which would lead to electricity exportation. In the latter case, the financial trans-
fers could constitute an actionable subsidy according to Art. 5 ASCM. However, it is likely 
that trade in "green" electricity in the near future will take place within the EU or between 
the EU and accession countries and therefore the appropriate level for the clarification of 
these conflicts would be the European Union and not the WTO.   
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7.4  Conclusions and Policy Options 
As we have shown the German price guarantees for electricity from renewable energy in 
the EEG and in the KWKG cannot be considered as subsidies under WTO law, as there is 
no financial contribution from the government involved. Even in the unlikely event that 
they would be considered a subsidy, they would be regarded as non-actionable, unless a 
WTO member could prove serious adverse effects to the domestic industry which are diffi-
cult to repair. Hence, the current national support for renewable energy production is un-
likely to cause trade conflicts at the WTO level in the near future. These findings suggest 
that there is no need to change this national energy policy approach because of current 
WTO rules. 
Furthermore, it is also unlikely that the tax exemptions under the ETR will be challenged 
in a WTO dispute in the near future. This kind of subsidies were considered to be non-
actionable up until 1999. However, a dispute could arise in the future, if tax exemptions 
under the ETR increase and a WTO member feels they injure its domestic industry. This 
could, for instance, become relevant if policy makers gave in to the pressure of interest 
groups and decided higher tax exemptions for energy-intensive industries under the ETR. 
In order to avoid a conflict with WTO law the best policy option is not to allow any spe-
cific subsidies, i.e. not to grant certain industries lower tax rates or exemptions from taxes 
under the ETR or at least to reduce them substantially. 
8 Conclusions 
This paper analyses the relationship between German energy policy instruments and WTO 
rules with particular emphasis on the German climate change policy. Our main finding is 
that in general, current German energy laws, which aim at reducing greenhouse gases, are 
compatible with international trade law. In particular, for the policy instruments that are 
used or are under consideration, we found that, first, current standards do not discriminate 
against foreign suppliers. However, they could be in conflict with WTO law if enforcement 
of non-product-related standards vis-à-vis foreign suppliers were introduced. Second, la-
belling of electricity from renewable resources can be set up in different ways. Mandatory 
labels are subject to WTO rules and must not be used as a protectionist tool; voluntary la-
bels are not subject to WTO rules, but could become a subject of trade conflict if the tech-
nology of electricity generation were regarded as a characteristic of the traded electricity.  
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In any case, it can be expected that future information requirements about production 
methods in the energy sector will lead to a differentiation of electricity based on its origin. 
Whether such discrimination of a homogeneous product is compatible with the concept of 
"like products" under WTO law remains a disputed issue and its relevance will increase 
with cross-border trade in electricity. Third, the design of trading systems for green certifi-
cates should consider basic WTO principles if the first attempts made by European coun-
tries to set output quotas for energy suppliers become a popular policy tool internationally. 
Fourth, our discussion of the scope for border tax adjustments for energy taxes shows that 
under current WTO law, the eligibility for this measure is not clearly defined. And finally, 
we find that the German price guarantees for producers of energy from renewable sources 
should not be considered as subsidies under WTO law.  
National policy aiming at international environmental protection can always be allowed as 
an exception under Article XX (b) or (g) GATT if complying with the prerequisites stipu-
lated. However, instead of claiming these exceptions for unilateral policy measures, coun-
tries should proceed in finding solutions for the global climate change problem in multilat-
eral agreements. Although the Kyoto Protocol does not address any trade obligations so 
far, this could be the case for future MEA dealing with energy-related non-product-related 
PPMs. Compatibility with international trade rules is important, but the WTO should not 
serve as the institution dominating legal limits of environmental policy measures. Rather, 
constant interaction and co-operation between these policy areas is necessary in order to 
first, take into account specific issues from multilateral environmental agreements within 
WTO rules, and second, design international environmental policy in accordance with in-
ternational trade principles. German initiatives for co-ordinating the political initiatives to 
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